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Abstract. We will discuss the RowHammer problem in DRAM, which
is a prime (and likely the first) example of how a circuit-level failure
mechanism in Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can cause
a practical and widespread system security vulnerability. RowHammer
is the phenomenon that repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM
chip predictably causes errors in physically-adjacent rows. It is caused by
a hardware failure mechanism called read disturb errors. Building on our
initial fundamental work that appeared at ISCA 2014, Google Project
Zero demonstrated that this hardware phenomenon can be exploited by
user-level programs to gain kernel privileges. Many other recent works
demonstrated other attacks exploiting RowHammer, including remote
takeover of a server vulnerable to RowHammer. We will analyze the
root causes of the problem and examine solution directions. We will also
discuss what other problems may be lurking in DRAM and other types
of memories, e.g., NAND flash and Phase Change Memory, which can
potentially threaten the foundations of reliable and secure systems, as
the memory technologies scale to higher densities.
1 Summary
As memory scales down to smaller technology nodes, new failure mechanisms
emerge that threaten its correct operation [79, 80]. If such failures are not antici-
pated and corrected, they can not only degrade system reliability and availability
but also, even more importantly, open up new security vulnerabilities: a mali-
cious attacker can exploit the exposed failure mechanism to take over an entire
system. As such, new failure mechanisms in memory can become practical and
significant threats to system security.
In this keynote talk, based on our ISCA 2014 paper [55], we introduce the
RowHammer problem in DRAM, which is a prime (and likely the first) example
of a real circuit-level failure mechanism that causes a practical and widespread
system security vulnerability. RowHammer, as it is now popularly referred to,
is the phenomenon that repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM chip
causes bit flips in physically-adjacent rows at consistently predictable bit loca-
tions. It is caused by a hardware failure mechanism called DRAM disturbance
errors, which is a manifestation of circuit-level cell-to-cell interference in a scaled
memory technology. Specifically, when a DRAM row is opened (i.e., activated)
and closed (i.e., precharged) repeatedly (i.e., hammered), enough times within
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a DRAM refresh interval, one or more bits in physically-adjacent DRAM rows
can be flipped to the wrong value. Using an FPGA-based DRAM testing infras-
tructure [70, 42], we tested 129 DRAM modules manufactured by three major
manufacturers in seven recent years (2008–2014) and found that 110 of them
exhibited RowHammer errors, the earliest of which dates back to 2010. Our
ISCA 2014 paper [55] provides a detailed and rigorous analysis of various char-
acteristics of RowHammer, including its data pattern dependence, repeatability
of errors, relationship with leaky cells, and various circuit-level causes of the
phenomenon.
We demonstrate that a very simple user-level program [55, 3] can reliably
and consistently induce RowHammer errors in commodity AMD and Intel sys-
tems using vulnerable DRAM modules. We released the source code of this
program [3], which Google Project Zero later enhanced [4]. Using our user-level
RowHammer program, we showed that both read and write accesses to memory
can induce bit flips, all of which occur in rows other than the one that is being
accessed. Since different DRAM rows are mapped to different software pages,
our user-level program could reliably corrupt specific bits in pages belonging to
other programs. As a result, RowHammer errors can be exploited by a malicious
program to breach memory protection and compromise the system. In fact, we
hypothesized, in our ISCA 2014 paper, that our user-level program, with some
engineering effort, could be developed into a disturbance attack that injects errors
into other programs, crashes the system, or hijacks control of the system.
RowHammer exposes a security threat since it leads to a serious breach of
memory isolation: an access to one memory row (e.g., an OS page) predictably
modifies the data stored in another row (e.g., another OS page). Malicious soft-
ware, which we call disturbance attacks [55], or RowHammer attacks, can be
written to take advantage of these disturbance errors to take over an entire sys-
tem. Inspired by our ISCA 2014 paper’s fundamental findings, researchers from
Google Project Zero demonstrated in 2015 that RowHammer can be effectively
exploited by user-level programs to gain kernel privileges on real systems [94, 95].
Tens of other works since then demonstrated other attacks exploiting RowHam-
mer. These include remote takeover of a server vulnerable to RowHammer via
JavaScript code execution [40], takeover of a victim virtual machine by another
virtual machine running on the same system [92], takeover of a mobile device
by a malicious user-level application that requires no permissions [103], takeover
of a mobile system by triggering RowHammer using the WebGL interface on
a mobile GPU [35], takeover of a remote system by triggering RowHammer
through the Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) protocol [101, 67], and var-
ious other attacks (e.g., [108, 14, 39, 87, 13, 45, 86, 8, 102, 85]). Thus, RowHammer
has widespread and profound real implications on system security, as it destroys
memory isolation on top of which modern system security principles are built.
We provide a wide variety of solutions, both immediate and longer-term, to
RowHammer, starting from our ISCA 2014 paper [55]. A popular immediate so-
lution we describe and analyze, is to increase the refresh rate of memory such
that the probability of inducing a RowHammer error before DRAM cells get re-
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freshed is reduced. Several major system manufacturers have adopted this solu-
tion and released security patches that increased DRAM refresh rates (e.g., [11,
43, 66, 34]) in memory controllers deployed in the field. While this solution is
practical and effective in reducing the vulnerability, assuming the refresh rate
is increased enough to avoid the vulnerability, it has the significant drawbacks
of increasing energy/power consumption, reducing system performance, and de-
grading quality of service experienced by user programs. Our paper shows that
the refresh rate needs to be increased by 7X if we want to eliminate every single
RowHammer-induced error we saw in our tests of 129 DRAM modules. Since
DRAM refresh is already a significant burden [69, 70, 31, 46, 47, 89, 49, 84, 33] on
energy, performance, and QoS, increasing it by any significant amount would
only exacerbate the problem. Yet, increased refresh rate is likely the most prac-
tical immediate solution to RowHammer that can protect vulnerable chips that
are already deployed in the field.
After describing and analyzing six solutions to RowHammer, our ISCA 2014
paper shows that the long-term solution to RowHammer can actually be simple
and low cost. We introduce a new idea, called PARA (Probabilistic Adjacent Row
Activation): when the memory controller closes a row (after it was activated),
with a very low probability, it refreshes the adjacent rows. The probability value
is a parameter determined by the system designer or provided programmatically,
if needed, to trade off between performance overhead and vulnerability protec-
tion guarantees. We show that this solution is very effective: it eliminates the
RowHammer vulnerability, providing much higher reliability guarantees than
modern hard disks provide today, while requiring no storage cost and having
negligible performance and energy overheads [55]. Variants of this solution are
currently being adopted in DRAM chips and memory controllers [5, 6].
The RowHammer problem leads to a new mindset that has enabled a re-
newed interest in hardware security research: real memory chips are vulnerable,
in a simple and widespread manner, and this causes real security problems. We
believe the RowHammer problem will worsen over time since DRAM cells are
getting closer to each other with technology scaling. Other similar vulnerabilities
may also be lurking in DRAM and other types of memories, e.g., NAND flash
memory or Phase Change Memory, that can potentially threaten the founda-
tions of secure systems [80]. Our work advocates a principled system-memory
co-design approach to memory reliability and security research that can enable
us to better anticipate and prevent such vulnerabilities.
2 Significance, Impact and the Future
RowHammer has spurred significant amount of research and industry atten-
tion since its publication in 2014. Our ISCA 2014 paper [55] is the first to
experimentally and scientifically demonstrate the RowHammer vulnerability, its
characteristics, and its prevalence in real DRAM chips. RowHammer is a prime
(and likely the first) example of a hardware failure mechanism that causes a
practical and widespread system security vulnerability. Thus, the implications
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of RowHammer and our ISCA 2014 paper on systems security is tremendous,
both in the short term and the long term: it is the first work we know of that
shows that a real reliability problem in one of the ubiquitous general-purpose
hardware components (DRAM chips) can cause practical and widespread system
security vulnerabilities.
Since its publication in 2014, RowHammer has already had significant real-
world impact on both industry and academia in at least four directions. These
directions will continue to exert long-term impact for RowHammer, as memory
cells continue to get closer to each other while the technology scaling of memory
continues.
First, our work has inspired many researchers to exploit RowHammer to
devise new attacks. As mentioned earlier, tens of papers were written in top
security venues that demonstrate various practical attacks exploiting RowHam-
mer (e.g., [108, 14, 39, 87, 13, 45, 8, 85, 40, 92, 103, 35]). These attacks started with
Google Project Zero’s first work in 2015 [94, 95] and they continue to this date,
with the latest ones that we know of being published in Summer 2018 [86, 67,
101, 102]. We believe there is a lot more to come in this direction: as systems se-
curity researchers understand more about RowHammer, and as the RowHammer
phenomenon continues to fundamentally affect memory chips due to technology
scaling problems [80], researchers and practitioners will develop different types
of attacks to exploit RowHammer in various contexts and in many more creative
ways. Some recent reports suggest that new-generation DDR4 DRAM chips are
vulnerable to RowHammer [58, 85, 8, 10], so the fundamental security research
on RowHammer is likely to continue into the future.
Second, due to its prevalence in real DRAM chips, as demonstrated in our
ISCA 2014 paper, RowHammer has become a popular phenomenon [105, 1, 2, 41,
58, 95, 83, 9, 37], which, in turn, has helped make hardware security even more
”mainstream” in popular media and the broader security community. It showed
that hardware reliability problems can be very serious security threats that
have to be defended against. A well-read article from the Wired magazine, all
about RowHammer, is entitled ”Forget Software – Now Hackers are Exploiting
Physics!” [38], indicating the shift of mindset towards very low-level hardware
security vulnerabilities in the popular mainstream security community. Many
other popular articles in press have been written about RowHammer, many of
which pointing to the our ISCA 2014 work [55] as the first demonstration and
scientific analysis of the RowHammer problem. Showing that hardware reliabil-
ity problems can be serious security threats and pulling them to the popular
discussion space, and thus influencing the mainstream discourse, creates a very
long term impact for the RowHammer problem.
Third, our work inspired many solution and mitigation techniques for RowHam-
mer from both researchers and industry practitioners. Apple publicly mentioned,
in their critical security release for RowHammer, that they increased the memory
refresh rates due to the ”original research by Yoongu Kim et al. (2014)” [11].
Memtest86 program was updated, including a RowHammer test, acknowledg-
ing our ISCA 2014 paper [83]. Many academic works developed solutions to
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RowHammer, working from our original research (e.g., [12, 50, 39, 96, 15, 44, 97,
36, 104, 65]). Multiple industrial solutions (e.g., [5, 6]) were inspired by our new
solution to RowHammer, Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation (PARA). We
believe such solutions will continue to be generated in both academia and indus-
try, extending RowHammer’s impact into the very long term.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, RowHammer enabled a shift of mind-
set among mainstream security researchers: general-purpose hardware is fallible
(in a very widespread manner) and its problems are actually exploitable. This
shift of mindset enabled many systems security researchers to examine hardware
in more depth and understand its inner workings and vulnerabilities better. We
believe it is no coincidence that two of the groups that concurrently discovered
the Meltdown [68] and Spectre [56] vulnerabilities (Google Project Zero and TU
Graz InfoSec) have heavily worked on RowHammer attacks before. We believe
this shift in mindset, enabled in good part by the existence and prevalence of
RowHammer, will continue to be very be important for discovering and solving
other potential vulnerabilities that may appear as a result of both technology
scaling and hardware design.
3 Other Potential Vulnerabilities
We believe that, as memory technologies scale to higher densities, other problems
may start appearing (or may already be going unnoticed) that can potentially
threaten the foundations of secure systems. There have been recent large-scale
field studies a well as small-scale controlled studies of real memory errors on
real devices and systems, showing that both DRAM and NAND flash memory
technologies are becoming less reliable [82, 78, 98–100,77, 93, 28, 27, 74, 73, 17, 25,
79, 84, 80]. As detailed experimental analyses of real DRAM and NAND flash
chips show, both technologies are becoming much more vulnerable to cell-to-cell
interference effects [82, 55, 26, 22, 20, 17, 21, 81, 72, 23, 28, 27, 79, 80], data reten-
tion is becoming significantly more difficult in both technologies [69, 47, 70, 49,
89, 31, 46, 75, 25, 18, 71, 17, 21, 19, 81, 48, 28, 27, 74, 73, 82, 79], and error variation
within and across chips is increasingly prominent [70, 63, 30, 29, 17, 21, 64, 51–
53]. Emerging memory technologies [79, 76], such as Phase-Change Memory [59,
111, 88, 90, 106, 91, 61, 60, 110, 109], STT-MRAM [32, 57], and RRAM/ReRAM/
memristors [107] are likely to exhibit similar and perhaps even more exacerbated
reliability issues. We believe, if not carefully accounted for and corrected, these
reliability problems may surface as security problems as well, as in the case of
RowHammer, especially if the technology is employed as part of the main mem-
ory system that is directly exposed to user-level programs. We believe future
work examining these vulnerabilities, among others, is promising for both fixing
the vulnerabilities and enabling the effective scaling of memory technology.
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